
The Northrop proposal for the XST competition showed much similarity to Lockheed's
'Have Blue" and "Senior Trend" designs

This photo shows the full-scale mock-up of Northrop's XST
contender, ready
for the 'pole-off' against Lockheed's own
As early as 1974, a DARPA study was initiated and led by Ken Perko. He requested
White Papers from Northrop, McDonnell Douglas, Fairchild, General Dynamics
and Grumman, asking two questions: 1°) What were the signature thresholds
that an air vehicle would have to achieve to be essentially undetectable at
an operationally useful range? 2°) What were the capabilities of each company
to design and build an aircraft with the necessary signatures? Fairchild and
Grumman did not express any interest in the study. The General Dynamics response
emphasized countermeasures and had little substantive technical content regarding
signature reduction. Northrop and MDD responded indicating a good understanding
of the problem and some capability to develop a "reduced-signature" air
vehicle. MDD was also the first to identify what appeared to be the appropiate
RCS thresholds. In late 1974 DARPA awarded Northrop and MDD contracts of aproximately
$100,000 each to conduct further studies. These initial studies were classified "Confidential",
the lowest of three major levels of security classification: Confidential,
Secret, and Top Secret. In the spring of 1975, DARPA used McDonnell Douglas's
values (confirmed by Hughes radar experts) as the goals for the program, and
challenged the two participants to find ways to achieve them.
Lockheed was not
invited to participate in the study because they were not considered to be
active in tactical aircraft developement at
the time. yet the DARPA study was not highly classified, so it eventually
came to the attention of
Ben Rich,
who
took over control of Skunk Works in January 1975. Lockheed
had not produced a fighter aircraft in over 10 years, and was on the edge
of moral and financial bankruptcy in the wake of a bribery scandal and the
failure
of
the L-1011. Kelly Johnson received permission from the CIA to share the previously
highly classified radar-cross-section test results on the SR-71/A-12, which
was sent to Dr. George Heilmeier, the head of DARPA, together with a formal
request to enter the stealth compitition. After a lot of arguing the Skunk
Works was allowed to enter the stealth compitition with no strings attached.
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Northrop XST
(Experimental Survivable Testbed)
Design
team led by: Irv
Waaland
Powerplant: no data
Date of design: 1975
In September 1975, Northrop and Lockheed's Skunk Works (McDonnell Douglas
had fallen out
of the competition) were asked
to design
a small prototype
aircraft
and
build a full scale model for a "pole-off" at the RCS range at Holloman
Air Force Base in New Mexico, with the winner going on to flight testing.
By now, the project's name had become the Experimental Survivable Testbed,
or
XST.
Irv Waaland, a Northrop designer knew that Northrop had a problem. Northrop's
analysts had concluded that it was most important to reduce its vehicle's RCS
from the nose and tail, and the nose-on RCS (the view an adversary had in the
critical head-on engagment) was more important than the rear aspect. Its XST
design was a diamond with more sweep on the leading edges than the trailing
edges. From the rear, it had low RCS as long as the radar was no more than
35 degrees off the tail. But the DARPA requirement treated RCS by quadrants:
The rear quadrant extended to 45 degrees on either side of the tail, thereby
including the parts of the
airframe where the Northrop design's RCS spiked. Waaland could not solve the
problem by increasing the sweep angle of the trailing edges, the aircraft would
become uncontrollable.
Northrop had an internal issue to deal with. "The level of
security on the observables was higher than it was on the airplane," says
Waaland, "and not too many of the airplane people were cleared into the
[details of the low-RCS design theory]. It was a great source of frustration,
because there was no ability to make compromises." This put Northrop at
a disadvantage, because the program was all about compromise: to minimize RCS
while attempting to preserve acceptable aerodynamics. the normally reserved
Waaland recalls epic shouting matches in which he would question John Cashen
(a Northrop electromagnetics expert) about some aspect of the mysterious electromagnetics. "You
know just enough to be dangerous," was Cashen's usual retort.
By now a change had crept into the program. Alan Brown traces it to the first
Lockheed and Northrop 1/3 scale tests at McDonnell Douglas' Gray Butte RCS
range in California's Mojave Desert in the December of 1975. (Lockheed tested
the D-21 vs. "Hopeless Diamond" here because it did not have a range
of it's own at the time.) The RCS numbers were not merely half of those of
a conventional aircraft, but a hundred or a thousand times smaller, enough
to make most radars useless. "People realized we had a tiger by the tail" says
Brown.
Throughout most of the testing, the competing contractor teams and their models
were kept in isolation from each other, Temporary quarters were set up so that
each team would have access to the range but could be kept apart from the other
team. However, after most of the tesing was completed, each team was allowed
to drive out on the range to view the other's model mounted on top of the 40
foot pylon.
Technical performance, risk, cost, and schedule of the two competitors were
very close. Therefore, choosing the winning team for PHASE II was somewhat
subjective (and since then has been argued with). Technically, Lockheed's entry
had a slight edge (based on the required quadrants). Overall, Northrop's XST
was possibly stealthier than the Lockheed entry, but this conclusion is based
on factors that weren't part of the DARPA requirements. Although both companies
had developed special materials and construction techniques, the perception
was that the Skunk Works had more experience with the use of these techniques
on actual aircraft. The Skunk Works also had a proven record of accomplishing
advanced, high-risk projects quickly under high security. These factors provided
confidence that the Skunk Works could execute the XST program successfully.
In April 1976 Lockheed was announced the winner of the PHASE I compition.
Population: not built (full-scale mock-up only)
Specs: unknown
Crew/passengers: 1 (planned)
Main source: http://www.f-117a.com/XST.html
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